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Abstract: String theory currently is the only viable candidate for a uniﬁed
description of all known natural forces. This article tries to demonstrate that
the fundamental structural and methodological diﬀerences that set string theory
apart from other physical theories have important philosophical consequences.
Focusing on implications for the realism debate in philosophy of science, it is
argued that both poles of that debate face new problems in the context of string
theory. On the one hand, the claim of underdetermination of scientiﬁc theory by
the available empirical data, which is a pivotal element of empiricism, loses much
of its plausibility. On the other hand, the dissolution of any meaningful notion
of an external ontological object destroys the basis for conventional versions of
scientiﬁc realism. String theory seems to suggest an intermediate position akin
to Structural Realism that is based on a newly emerging principle, to be called
the principle of theoretical uniqueness.
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1 Introduction
In one respect, quantum mechanics resembles the music of Arnold Schönberg: its
restricted accessibility awards eternal youth. The conception that was created
80 years ago to replace the failing laws of classical physics in the microscopic
world still looks fresh and exciting and remains the paragon of a modern scien-
tiﬁc theory. The unshakable status of the quantum principle as the grand enigma
at the base of modern physical inquiry has a peculiar consequence however: it
keeps the scientiﬁc and philosophical community beyond a small group of experts
strangely insensitive to the signiﬁcance of the newer developments in fundamental
physics. Hidden from the outsider behind an impenetrable forest of mathematical
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formalism, the conceptual novelties of those developments are usually taken as
complex but minor addenda to the epoch-making events of the quantum revo-
lution. Though current physical theories like gauge theory or quantum gravity1
are being analyzed in philosophy of physics, the general discourse in philosophy
of science has remained largely untouched by arguments from recent elementary
high energy physics. String theory in particular, which will be the subject of this
article, plays a leading role in contemporary high energy physics but so far has
remained fairly unknown territory even for specialized philosophy of physics.2
String theory is the most ambitious theory in fundamental physics today. Replac-
ing the point-like elementary particles of traditional high energy physics by minis-
cule but extended objects, it presently constitutes the only promising approach
to provide a uniﬁed description of all known natural forces. Despite a history of
more than thirty years of string theoretical research, however, string theory still
remains an empirically unconﬁrmed and theoretically incomplete theory. While it
has been argued elsewhere (Dawid 2006) that a philosophical analysis of the struc-
ture and dynamics of string theoretical research can open up new perspectives
on the evaluation of string theory's current scientiﬁc status, the present article
will not directly discuss the question of string theory's viability. It will rather
ask the conditional question: if string theory were an empirically viable physical
theory, what would be its philosophical implications? Assessing the outcome of
this discussion, one should bear in mind, however, that string physics represents
a natural continuation of the particle physics research program. It is intricately
entangled with other ﬁelds of particle physics model building and shares many
core concepts with well established and empirically well tested theories in the
ﬁeld. Philosophical implications identiﬁed in the context of string physics thus
often can be understood as an intensiﬁcation of trends already perceptible in the
context of empirically conﬁrmed theories of high energy physics.
The present work will focus on string theory's potential consequences for a piv-
otal debate in philosophy of science: the debate about scientiﬁc realism. It will
be argued that the scientiﬁc concepts and techniques that have emerged during
the last few decades in particle physics and found their most universal realization
in string theory imply deep and unexpected changes in physics' take on physical
reality. If string theory is scientiﬁcally viable, they may have philosophical con-
sequences whose signiﬁcance can well be compared to the philosophical impact of
quantum mechanics. Following a sketch of string theory, a short introduction into
the scientiﬁc realism debate will set the scene for the main discussion. Sections 4
and 5 will present two diﬀerent kinds of arguments against empiricism which can
be derived from high energy physics and string theory in particular; Section 6 will
then give a string-based argument against scientiﬁc realism. Finally, an attempt
will be made to draw a consistent conclusion from the seemingly contradictory
messages which emerge when scientiﬁc realism meets strings.
1 An instructive recent collection of articles on quantum gravity can be found in Callender/
Huggett (2001).
2 Some of the rare examples of philosophical reﬂections on string theory are Weingard (2001),
Butterﬁeld/Isham (2001), Hedrich (2002) and Hedrich (2007).
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2 String Theory
String theory3 was ﬁrst suggested as a universal theory of microphysics in 1974.4
The approach had to struggle with big conceptual diﬃculties in the beginning and
was seen as an exotic fantasy until its breakthrough ten years later, when some
important consistency problems were ﬁnally resolved. Although there still doesn't
exist any direct experimental evidence for string theory, today it is acknowledged
by a majority of high energy physicists as the only promising candidate for the
construction of a truly uniﬁed theory of all natural forces.
The basic idea of string theory is to replace the point-like elementary particles
of traditional particle theories by one-dimensional strings in order to provide a
basis for the uniﬁcation of quantum physics and gravity. The core obstacle to an
integration of gravity in the context of quantum ﬁeld theory is the occurrence of
untreatable inﬁnities in calculations of particle interactions due to the possibility
of point particles coming arbitrarily close to each other.5 The extendedness of
strings `smears out' the contact point between any two objects and thus pro-
vides a decisively improved framework that seems to allow ﬁnite calculations6.
String theory represents a natural continuation of the high energy physics re-
search program that has close ties with other theories in high energy physics like
supersymmetry, supergravity or large extra dimensions. It requires mathematical
methods beyond those of traditional elementary particle physics, however, due
to the highly complex structure of one- or more-dimensional objects moving in
higher-dimensional backgrounds.
The seemingly innocent step from point-like objects to strings implies an amazing
host of complex structural consequences. A string theory able to describe matter
can only be consistently formulated in 10 space-time dimensions (respectively 11
space-time dimensions in one speciﬁc formulation). This prediction marks the ﬁrst
time in the history of physics that the number of spatial dimensions can be derived
from a physical theory. The obvious fact that only 4 space-time dimensions are
macroscopically visible is taken into account by the assumption that 6 dimensions
are compactiﬁed. They have the topological shape of a cylinder surface where,
after some translation in the compactiﬁed direction, one ends up again at the
point of departure. The compactiﬁcation radius as well as the string length are
assumed to be so small that both the extension of the string and the additional
dimensions are invisible to the current particle experiments. Both scales are
expected to lie close to the Planck length, the characteristic length scale of gravity
3The topical standard work on string theory is Polchinski (1998). A classic earlier book is
Green/Schwarz/Witten (1987). A more accessible presentation for the general physicist can be
found in Zwiebach (2004). An instructive popular presentation for the non-physicist is Greene
(1999).
4 The history of the concept of strings even goes back to the late 1960ies, when it was
discussed in a diﬀerent context however.
5 The reason why this problem is more dramatic in the presence of gravitation than in a
calculation of nuclear interactions has to do with the fact that the gravitational force grows
with increased energy density.
6 Though the ﬁniteness of string theory is not proven conclusively, it is supported by fairly
strong evidence.
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where the gravitational force becomes comparably strong to the nuclear forces.
According to conventional wisdom, the Planck scale lies so far beyond the reach
of particle experiments that there is no hope ever to observe strings with the
established methods of particle experiment.7 It turns out that the posit of one-
dimensional elementary objects implies the additional introduction of even higher
dimensional objects like two dimensional membranes or, to put it generally, d-
dimensional so called d-branes.
In conventional quantum physics, elementary particles carry quantum numbers
which determine their behavior. A particle's characteristics like spin or charge,
which are expressed by quantum numbers, constitute intrinsic and irreducible
properties. Strings do not have quantum numbers but can diﬀer from each other
by their topological shape and their dynamics: Strings can be open, meaning
that they have two endpoints, or closed like a rubber band. If they are closed,
they can be wrapped around the various compactiﬁed dimensions in diﬀerent
ways. Both, open and closed strings can assume diﬀerent oscillation modes.
These characteristics deﬁne the macroscopic appearance of the string. To the
observer who does not have suﬃcient resolution to perceive the stringy structure,
a string in a speciﬁc oscillation mode and topological position looks like a point-
like particle with certain quantum numbers. A change of, let's say, its oscillation
mode would be perceived as a transmutation into a diﬀerent particle. Strings at
a fundamental level do not have coupling constants either. The strength of their
interaction with each other again can be reduced to some aspect of their dynamics
(the ground state of a certain mode of the string expansion, the dilaton, gives the
string coupling constant). All characteristic numbers of a quantum ﬁeld theory
are thus being dissolved into geometry and dynamics of an oscillating string.
String theories which are able to describe matter ﬁelds have to be supersymmetric,
i. e. they must be invariant under speciﬁc transformations between particles of
diﬀerent spin. Models which have this property are called superstring models.
It turns out that superstrings automatically
include gravitation and thus represent a natural candidate for a uniﬁcation of
gravity and microphysics.
One very important feature of string theory remains to be mentioned. The string
world shows a remarkable tendency to link seemingly quite diﬀerent string scenar-
ios by so-called duality relations. Two dual theories are exactly equivalent with
respect to their observational consequences, though they are quite diﬀerently
constructed and may involve diﬀerent types of elementary objects and diﬀerent
topological scenarios. The phenomenon can be best introduced by an example.
As it was mentioned above, closed strings can be wrapped around compactiﬁed
dimensions. On the other hand, strings can also just move along a compactiﬁed
dimension. Due to basic principles of quantum mechanics momenta in closed
7 There do exist theoretical scenarios of large or warped extra dimensions where the ex-
tremely high four-dimensional Planck scale we know is understood as an artefact of extra
dimensions which hide a fundamental Planck scale that lies much closer to the observable
regime. Thus it is not entirely excluded that strings will some not too distant day become
observable after all.
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dimensions can only assume certain discrete quantized levels. Thus there exist
two basic discrete numbers which characterize the state of a closed string in a
compactiﬁed dimension: The number of times the string is wrapped around this
dimension and the number of its momentum state in that very same dimension.8
One of the duality relations of string theory, T-duality, implies that a model where
a string with characteristic length9 l is wrapped n times around a dimension with
radius R and has momentum level m is dual to a model where a string is wrapped
m times around a dimension with radius l2/R and has momentum level n. The
two descriptions give identical physics. The key precondition for this remarkable
phenomenon is the quantum uncertainty that provides the fuzziness necessary
for such unlikely identiﬁcation. It is only in string theory, however, that dualities
become a characteristic feature of physical theories. A little more about dualities
will be said in Section 6 where this concept will assume an important role in the
philosophical argument.
3 Scientiﬁc Realism versus Empiricism
The scientiﬁc realism debate, which shall be confronted with string physics in the
following, descends from the age-old problem of the relation between observation
and theory. While pre-modern philosophy generally tended to rank the place-
value of theoretical reasoning higher than profane observation, the success of the
scientiﬁc method with its strong emphasis on experimental conﬁrmation inverted
that hierarchy. Observation became the ultimate judge over the justiﬁcation of
theoretical statements.10 Provided that statements must have an observational
implication to be meaningful, the question arises whether theoretical statements
can constitute knowledge about anything beyond observational data at all. Scien-
tiﬁc antirealists deny this while scientiﬁc realists want to retain at least some trace
of the golden age of theoretical autarky. In the context of modern scientiﬁc the-
ories, the question circles around the status of theoretical concepts which do not
refer to directly observable objects. The scientiﬁc realist awards to the electron
and the quark the same ontological status as to chairs and tables. Her antireal-
ist opponent asserts that the concepts of unobservable objects are of importance
merely as technical tools to describe and predict visible phenomena. Two classical
antirealist positions can be distinguished. The instrumentalist ﬂatly denies that
statements about unobservable theoretical objects can be literally true. Bas van
Fraassen11 pointed out, however, that there is a less radical way of rejecting sci-
entiﬁc realism. His constructive empiricism acknowledges that statements about
theoretical objects can be literally true in principle but claims that it is impossible
to collect suﬃcient evidence for the truth of any particular statement. Shunning
8 The two numbers are called winding number respectively Kaluza-Klein level.
9 The characteristic string length denotes its length when no energy is being invested to
stretch it.
10 Excluded are solely mathematical statements, which are usually understood as meaningful
but a priori.
11 van Fraassen (1980).
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the ontological quality of the instrumentalist assertion, constructive empiricism
remains on an epistemological level.
During the long history of the scientiﬁc realism debate, realists as well as em-
piricists have produced a complex web of interrelated objections against their
respective opponents. The core of the dispute may be represented by the non-
realist's pessimistic meta-induction12 and the realist's no miracles argument13.
According to the pessimistic meta-induction, the history of science shows that
new empirical or theoretical developments have often led to the replacement of
formerly successful theories by new concepts with a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ontol-
ogy. Since there is no reason to assume that this pattern will terminate today, it
is implausible to hold that the present theories are approximately true or contain
scientiﬁc objects which refer to anything in the outside world. The no miracles
argument, on the other hand, asserts that the conspicuous ability of scientiﬁc
theories to predict new phenomena correctly would be a miracle if the theories
in question were not approximately true and did not contain scientiﬁc objects
which referred to something in the outside world. Further arguments on both
sides enhance the impression of an uncomfortable impasse: antirealists doubt the
validity of the realist strategy to explain scientiﬁc predictive success and question
whether realists can even give a satisfactory deﬁnition of what makes a scientiﬁc
object real; realists point out that the antirealist does not oﬀer a satisfactory
way of delimiting observable from unobservable objects and ignores the striking
realist connotations of the technical treatment of well understood unobservable
objects. The plausibility of the realist's assertion that antirealism misses some-
thing important about science stands against the antirealist's convincing claim
that the conventional forms of realism are not satisfactory. We will leave aside for
now a discussion of attempts in philosophy of science to ﬁnd some middle ground
between realism and empiricism, and approach the problem from a diﬀerent an-
gle. It shall be analyzed to what extent contemporary high energy physics, and
in particular string theory, might contribute to an altered understanding of the
question of realism.
4 Theoretical Complexity against Empiricism
The recent evolution of fundamental physics may be understood to carry one
message for the realism debate that can be appreciated without going into the
details of new physical conceptions: empiricism is most plausible in the context
of moderately developed theory. The higher developed the theoretical apparatus
gets, the more diﬃcult it becomes to retain any plausibility of the assertion that
its subject must not be anything but observation.
At least two reasons for this claim may be stated. First, the ascent of theory can
open new frontiers of the visible whose identiﬁcation with frontiers of existence
appears less plausible than in the classical cases. A good example can be found
12 The seminal version of the argument was given in Laudan (1981).
13 See e. g. Putnam (1975) and Boyd (1996).
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in modern cosmology. Most versions of instrumentalism uphold the claim that
statements about the past can have a truth value. Now modern cosmology tells
us that the early highly dense stages of our universe represent a world void of
all macroscopic objects and remote from all classical physical conditions as we
know them. The early universe thus is just as adverse to direct visibility as
microphysical processes today. The instrumentalist therefore is forced to deny
real existence to all objects in the early universe and, if staying on course,
would consequently have to insert her own ontological big bang to denote the
point in time when the real world as she accepts it start to exist. Everything
before this point would just be a mathematical construction to structure the
later evolution. Things would start their existence out of nothing just because
any earlier evolution could not satisfy the visibility condition. This partition of a
physically continuous causal process by an arbitrary ontological distinction looks
quite unconvincing. It is particularly awkward since the ontological posit must
rely entirely on abstract physical arguments about the physical conditions of the
universe at a stage that was void of and adverse to any form of intelligent life.
The argument thus lacks any connection with actual human observation, which
clearly runs counter to the initial motivation of instrumentalism to emphasize
the special status of actual human observation in contrast to abstract theory
building. Constructive empiricism is less aﬀected by this problem because its
epistemological limits can be placed on the time axis with less argumentative
eﬀort.
The second point equally aﬀects instrumentalism and constructive empiricism:
once the balance between theoretical eﬀort and observational consequence gets
strongly tilted towards theory, it becomes quite problematic to hold that the the-
oretical physicist's sound motivations for her activity exclusively lie in the visible
regime. A comparison of the situation at the heyday of quantum mechanics with
the situation today shows the problem: The observable consequences of quantum
mechanics are enormous, culminating in the explosions of atomic bombs which
are impossible to overlook even for the staunchest sceptic of theoretical physics.
In that context, the microscopic structuring done by theoretical quantum physi-
cists for all its complexity might still be understood as a reasonable technical
eﬀort to produce and predict its stunning observable eﬀects. In modern high
energy physics, on the other hand, the characteristic phenomenological implica-
tions of theories like the particle physics Standard Model or supersymmetry look
marginal if taken out of their theoretical context. Often they are limited to a
few unusual lines on a set of photos taken in a collider experiment. It requires a
multi billion dollar build-up of huge particle colliders and the sustained work of
thousands of experimentalists to see these lines at all. To explain them, equally
large numbers of theoretical physicists devote all their time and energy and feel
compelled to develop theories of unprecedented complexity. The claim that the
development of modern high energy physics' elaborate theories cannot be justiﬁed
by the quest for truth about the micro-world but solely by these theories' techni-
cal ability to structure and predict some miniscule lines in Geneva or Chicago14
14 The two locations where the collider experiments at highest energies take place these days.
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simply would amount to declaring the high energy physics community a bunch
of insane and money-wasting crackpots. Most philosophers of science nowadays
would agree that any insinuation in this direction oversteps the authority of phi-
losophy of science.15 But to concede that the enterprise of high energy physics
is justiﬁed means to accept justiﬁcation from somewhere within the theoretical
body of its theories, beyond the dry and minimalist phenomenological surface.
It means to accept that we spend money and time to acquire knowledge about
quarks, gauge bosons, the hot early universe or the big bang and not just about
the weird pattern of lines on a photo. In order to acquire knowledge of the latter
kind, we must be conﬁdent that at least some of the statements contained in
the theories in question are approximately true in a literal sense. To adopt this
attitude, however, bluntly contradicts the core claims of both instrumentalism
and constructive empiricism.
String theory constitutes a further step towards a conception of scientiﬁc activity
that is at variance with an empiricist stance. It is unclear when - if at all - there
will be an experiment that can test string theory directly and how that experiment
would look like. The focus of string theoretical interest today therefore must lie on
the theoretical structures developed. If string theorists claim - as many of them
do - that they gain new insights into nature by developing their theory, they can
only refer to (potential) knowledge about theoretical objects or structures and
not to knowledge about visible phenomena.
5 Scientiﬁc Underdetermination
5.1 A Disparity of Views
String theory creates serious problems for empiricism at an entirely diﬀerent level
as well. A look at string theory's current status shall set the stage for the discus-
sion of this point. A peculiar disparity of views has been noticeable since the rise
of the theory in the mid 1980s and has recently developed into a sometimes vit-
riolic dispute between exponents and opponents of the string theoretical research
program. String physicists themselves have the at times euphoric feeling to work
on a pivotal and historic step towards a fuller understanding of the world. String
theory's lack of experimental corroboration and its sadly incomplete state, to be
sure, are generally acknowledged as deplorable weak points. Nevertheless, except
for a minority who see themselves as mere mathematicians, string theorists are
convinced to have reached deeper insight into the structure of physical matter
than anyone before. This understanding is shared in a slightly more cautious
way by many exponents of adjacent ﬁelds like particle physics model building
or cosmology. The majority of physicists in other ﬁelds, from phenomenological
15 Past unfortunate excursions of natural philosophy into the realm of scientiﬁc prediction
have laid the ground for the widespread conviction that philosophy of science should solely inter-
pret the scientiﬁc process and abstain from censoring it. There do exist philosophers of science,
however, who, feel conﬁdent to give advice to scientiﬁc goal deﬁnition from a philosophical
perspective (see e.g. Cartwright 1999).
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high energy physics over canonical quantum gravity to applied physics, as well
as most philosophers of science, have a substantially more critical perspective on
the status of string theory. It is their understanding that, considering the lack
of empirical conﬁrmation, string theory has never left the phase of pure specula-
tion. After more than thirty years of intense work on the subject that has neither
produced any testable prediction nor even anything close to a complete theory,
outspoken critics of the string theoretical research program recommend to focus
on the search for alternatives rather than stick for ever to an enormously demand-
ing but potentially futile enterprise. Despite the sometimes polemic wording, the
disagreement between the two sides is not of a fundamentalist nature. String
theorists do not dare to be absolutely sure about the existence of strings and
their critics concede that they might turn out to be on the right track after all, if
an experimental test can be found. Still the degree of mutual alienation is quite
signiﬁcant.
The described disparity of views about the validity of a new theory has charac-
teristics of a paradigm change à la Kuhn (Kuhn 1962). The rift goes deeper,
however, than in standard cases of paradigm change in science. In the eyes of
the critics of string theory, a theory without experimental backing, whatever the
details, cannot be called a well established theory. Exaggerated trust in that
theory thus leaves the path of sober natural science. For the string theorist, to
the contrary, her trust in the theory is based on a careful scientiﬁc analysis of
the theory's theoretical merits and its contextual embedding. The fundamental
disagreement about the value of string theory therefore is not a matter of physical
detail, it is a matter of deﬁning the authority and power of purely theoretical rea-
soning within the scientiﬁc process. If one wants to use the word paradigm as a
technical term solely applicable to perspectives within a scientiﬁc ﬁeld, one might
call the rift between string theorists and phenomenologists a meta-paradigmatic
rift. The two sides do not agree on the deﬁnition of science.
Similar situations have occurred before. A prominent example is the opposition of
empiricist physicists like Ernst Mach to the posit of invisible scientiﬁc objects like
atoms in physics at the turn of the 19th century. Their understanding of science
was so closely bound to the principle of direct observation that they considered
talk about invisible objects unscientiﬁc.16 The dispute receded from the physical
regime in the 20th century, when it became generally accepted scientiﬁc standard
to argue on the basis of invisible structures, but continued on a philosophical
interpretational level, where it constitutes the core motive of instrumentalism
and constructive empiricism.
The diﬀerent points of view on string theory can be understood as a sequel of
the old empiricist dispute. The string theorists' self-conﬁdence without empiri-
cal backing once again infringes on the dominance of observation in science and
16 An important diﬀerence between the earlier reservations against the status of invisible
scientiﬁc objects and the present ones against the relevance of string theory should be empha-
sized: Contrary to the latter, the Machian arguments were not based on the consensual position
of the traditional scientiﬁc community. They rather construed an artiﬁcial notion of an ideal
scientiﬁc attitude which itself constituted a new position and had never been fully reﬂected in
the scientist's perspective.
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seems to suggest a more dramatic shift of the scientiﬁc paradigm than in the case
of the acceptance of invisible scientiﬁc objects. The latter changed the meaning
of observable by acknowledging the option to measure observables indirectly,
but it kept the experimental primacy fully intact. String theorists, though still
subscribing to experiment's position as the ultimate judge over scientiﬁc theory,
in fact seem to diminish its role by assuming that scientists can develop a con-
siderable degree of conﬁdence in the viability of scientiﬁc statements on a purely
theoretical basis. In a nutshell, they claim: experiment is important if we can
carry it out, but if we can not, scientiﬁc progress can proceed without it.
What drives string theorists towards this signiﬁcant shift in their conception of
science? When physics fully endorsed scientiﬁc objects like atoms at the beginning
of the 20th century, scientiﬁc progress inevitably enforced this step as many newly
discovered phenomena just did not ﬁnd any other satisfactory explanation. Does
contemporary high energy physics oﬀer an equally forceful argument for string
theory's apparent theoretical autarky?
5.2 Scientiﬁc Underdetermination
The following attempt to answer this question will crucially rely on the concept of
underdetermination of scientiﬁc theory building by the available data (henceforth
to be called scientiﬁc underdetermination, following Dawid 2006). Scientiﬁc un-
derdetermination must be clearly distinguished from two more prominent forms
of underdetermination. On the one hand, it must be delimited from Quinean
underdetermination as formulated in Quine (1970), which asserts the existence of
scientiﬁc theories that are empirically equivalent with respect to all possible em-
pirical data. Scientiﬁc underdetermination, to the contrary, asserts the existence
of several or many theories which ﬁt the presently available data but may diﬀer
in their predictions with respect to future data. On the other hand, scientiﬁc un-
derdetermination diﬀers from Humean underdetermination by taking for granted
certain pre-assumptions and pre-conditions of scientiﬁc theory building. While
Hume points out the logical impossibility of deducing any future phenomenology
from past observations, science relies on the inductive inference from observed
regularity patterns to predictions of future events. Furthermore, satisfactory
scientiﬁc theories are expected to satisfy a number of general conditions like a
certain degree of universality or the avoidance of ad-hoc posits which account
for individual events. Scientiﬁc underdetermination is realized only if several or
many theories which satisfy the stated conditions and therefore qualify as serious
scientiﬁc contenders can be built in accordance with the available empirical data.
Whether or not scientiﬁc underdetermination is considered a characteristic of the
scientiﬁc process at a certain stage thus does not have any implications for the
more elementary problem of induction.
In the following discussion of scientiﬁc underdetermination, we will disregard em-
pirically equivalent theories and focus on theories which, while all in agreement
with the presently available data, can be distinguished by future experiments.
The term scientiﬁc underdetermination thus will be used synonymously with
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the notion of transient underdetermination introduced by Sklar (1975) and dis-
cussed e.g. by Stanford (2001).17
It is generally assumed that scientiﬁc theory building is underdetermined by the
available empirical data. If scientiﬁc theory building were not scientiﬁcally under-
determined, scientiﬁc progress would have to be exclusively accumulative. The
replacement of temporarily successful theories by conceptually diﬀerent succes-
sors would be excluded since any such replacement would imply that at least two
theories, the old and the new one, were compatible with the available empirical
data at the time when the old theory was valid. History of science shows, how-
ever, that scientiﬁc progress in the past was by no means purely accumulative.
The scientiﬁc underdetermination of contemporary scientiﬁc theories can then be
inferred from the historic examples of theory replacement based on the pessimistic
meta-induction cited in Section 3.
The importance of scientiﬁc underdetermination is not conﬁned to instances of
theory replacement. In many scientiﬁc ﬁelds it seems clear that large numbers
of theories could be constructed which would be compatible with the currently
available data but would make predictions of future phenomena which just do not
agree with nature. Any such diversity of theoretical options exempliﬁes scientiﬁc
underdetermination.
Still, it seems clear that entirely unrestrained scientiﬁc underdetermination does
not accord with the observed characteristics of scientiﬁc research. Natural science
shows a distinctive tendency of favoring one speciﬁc fundamental theory about
a certain subject at each stage of its evolution. This fact delimits natural sci-
ence from other ﬁelds like history or social sciences and is at variance with an
indiscriminate postulate of scientiﬁc underdetermination. In addition, the very
same history of science that delivers uncounted examples of fundamental theory
change also knows of many instances where theories successfully predicted en-
tirely new phenomena. If there existed an unlimited number of equally promising
alternative scientiﬁc theories which ﬁt any given set of physical data but make
diﬀerent empirical predictions with respect to future experiments, it would be
unclear how scientists could manage to pick the correct theory so often (see e.g.
Dawid 2007). The predictive success of science, which, as noted in Section 3, is
deployed against antirealist positions by the no-miracles argument, therefore also
indicates the existence of limitations to underdetermination.
The degree of scientiﬁc underdetermination thus emerges as a highly nontrivial
characteristic of the scientiﬁc process; a characteristic that will be crucial for the
present discussion for one reason: it largely determines the status of empirically
unconﬁrmed scientiﬁc theory building. To a hypothetical scientist who denies
scientiﬁc underdetermination, the viability of empirical predictions which stem
17 We do not use the term transient in the present article since it would be a little misleading
in our context. Transient underdetermination is transient only with respect to a speciﬁc set
of empirically distinguishable theories. The classical understanding of scientiﬁc progress as
a never ending sequence of empirically motivated theory changes implies, however, that the
underdetermination of theory building by the available data is not transient in a wider sense:
there is no ﬁnite program of empirical testing that would remove it.
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from a coherent theoretical description of the available data would seem just
as reliable as the assumption that a viable scientiﬁc description of the given
phenomena exists at all. Given that scientiﬁc underdetermination seems to be
a matter of fact, though, its suspected limitations may still justify a certain
degree of conﬁdence with respect to an empirically unconﬁrmed theory's validity.
Totally unlimited scientiﬁc underdetermination, ﬁnally, would destroy all hope of
choosing the right theory without direct empirical guidance.
At this point, string physics enters the stage. While science knows instances
where purely theoretical arguments have instilled some degree of conﬁdence in
empirically unconﬁrmed theoretical schemes, the principle of scientiﬁc underde-
termination has been considered suﬃciently strong to prevent the full endorse-
ment of those theories. The primate of empirical conﬁrmation has always re-
mained uncontested. String physics may be the ﬁrst example where the theory's
appraisal by its exponents may be taken to suggest otherwise. It thus may be
suspected that, in the eyes of its exponents, string theory provides reasons for as-
suming unusually strong limitations to scientiﬁc underdetermination which justify
a higher emphasis on theoretical arguments for evaluating the viability of scien-
tiﬁc statements. This understanding would oﬀer a plausible explanation for the
striking antagonism between string theorists and the theory's external critics:
while string physicists themselves feel impressed by the new kinds of indications
of strong limitations to underdetermination which they encounter in their daily
work, physicists who don't share that experience or feel particularly fond of the
traditional scientiﬁc paradigm cannot understand the string physicists' disregard
for the traditional and well established principles of theory appraisal.
5.3 Limitations to Scientiﬁc Underdetermination in String
Theory
Dawid (2006) oﬀers arguments for the claim that strong indications of new lim-
itations to scientiﬁc underdetermination can indeed be found in string theory.
Since these arguments will play an essential role in the later analysis, they shall
be sketched in the present subsection. The reader who looks for a thorough
argumentation, however, should resort to Dawid (2006).
Arguments in favor of limitations to scientiﬁc underdetermination emerge at two
diﬀerent levels. The ﬁrst kind of reasoning is based on general characteristics of
the research process that leads towards string theory.18
Maybe the most conspicuous argument in the eyes of string physicists is the ar-
gument of no choice. String physicists claim that, after intense investigations in
various directions, their approach has remained the only viable approach leading
towards a uniﬁed theory of gravity and nuclear interactions that has been even
18 The three arguments to be presented in this context reproduce in a structured way what
may be called common lore in string physics. It is diﬃcult to pin down a locus classicus for
each of these arguments. A combination of all three can be found in Chapter 1 of Polchinski
(1998) and in Polchinski (1999). The argument of no choice and the argument of conceptual
coherence appear in Greene (1999) (see e.g. Chapter 1).
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remotely successful. Loop-quantum gravity and other approaches in canonical
quantum gravity from that perspective can not count as alternatives because
they only discuss the reconciliation of gravity with basic principles of quantum
physics without oﬀering strategies to include a full theoretical description of nu-
clear interactions. With respect to fully uniﬁed theories, string physicists oﬀer
some qualitative arguments to demonstrate that very diﬀerent points of depar-
ture which seem to have nothing to do with string physics, after more careful
examination turn out to lead back towards string theory (see e.g. Polchinski
1999).
The signiﬁcance of these statements is taken to be supported by past experi-
ence in particle physics: if physicists knock on many doors to solve a conceptual
problem and exactly one opens that in turn leads towards rich and coherent new
structure, chances apparently are good that this solution will turn out to be
empirically viable. The most impressive witness to this claim is the standard
model of particle physics. Crucial elements of the standard model like the gauge
structure of interactions have been suggested without immediate empirical ev-
idence based on purely theoretical argumentation in order to solve theoretical
consistency problems. Eventually, the deployment of these concepts has been
conﬁrmed by experiment and has led to a large number of empirically viable
predictions. String physicists argue that alternatives have been checked more
carefully in the case of string physics than it had been at the time of the devel-
opment of the standard model, which may instil a certain amount of trust in the
viability of string theory's conceptual claims.
An additional argument is based on surprising instances of conceptual coherence
in the context of string theory. It is generally accepted that a scientiﬁc theory is
convincingly conﬁrmed by empirical data that did not inﬂuence the construction
of the theory but is correctly predicted by it. In a similar way, a theory may
be corroborated on purely theoretical grounds. It may provide improvements
of the theoretical understanding of interconnections between diﬀerent physical
phenomena even though the construction principles applied when creating the
theory did not aim at that kind of improvement. String physicists argue that
such theoretical conﬁrmation should be taken seriously as a basis for judging a
theory's viability. String physics oﬀers a number of surprising instances of con-
ceptual coherence. Three of the most important ones are the fact that a theory of
quantized extended objects implies gravity, the fact that a string theory of matter
requires supersymmetry (which joins two important directions of particle physics
research) and the fact that string theory in certain special cases can explain the
connection between black hole entropy and the black hole event horizon.
Each one of the three presented reasons for string theorists' self conﬁdence can
be interpreted in terms of a devaluation of the scientiﬁc underdetermination prin-
ciple. The argument of no choice directly suggests that the existence of alterna-
tive scientiﬁcally satisfactory theories is a less natural assumption in the case of
string theory than in prior physical contexts. The empirical success of the particle
physics research program as well as string theory's tendency to create unexpected
internal coherence may be taken as indirect signs of signiﬁcant limitations to sci-
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entiﬁc underdetermination since unlimited underdetermination would render the
occurrence of both unlikely.
While the three arguments presented up to this point have precursors in ear-
lier scientiﬁc theory building and may be understood in terms of (preliminary)
highpoints of longstanding developments, string theory also oﬀers genuinely new
arguments which hint in the same direction at a diﬀerent level: the theoreti-
cal structure of string physics itself seems to suggest a devaluation of scientiﬁc
underdetermination.
Of crucial importance in this context are two related properties of string theory.
Unlike all other known physical theories, string theory at a fundamental level
does not have any free parameters. Neither does it have any dimensionless pa-
rameters which can be freely adjusted to ﬁt empirical data nor does it have any
dimensionful parameters whose values can be tuned with respect to characteris-
tic parameters of a relevant measuring apparatus.19 Beyond that point, based
on some very basic assumptions like the existence of matter and of more than
one spatial dimension, string theory shows an even higher degree of uniqueness.
Due to the phenomenon of string duality, which will be addressed in Section 6,
there seems to remain no freedom of constructing diﬀerent types of string theory
at a fundamental level. Rather, there seems to be only one way to construct
the fundamental structure of string theory. The lack of structural freedom of
choice together with the lack of free parameters shall be called the structural
uniqueness of string theory.
It is not clear at this point in how far string theory's structural uniqueness trans-
lates into one inevitable set of parameter values of low energy theories like the
Standard Model. From a string theoretical perspective, the Standard Model
parameters are eﬀective parameters which are uniquely determined by string the-
oretical features like the value of the string coupling constant, the radii of the
compactiﬁed dimensions or the number of D-branes. These stringy features again
must be understood as the result of a dynamical process that is based on the fun-
damental equations of string theory (which, as described, do not have any free
parameters) and leads from the big bang towards some ground state of the the-
ory. If string theory would have one theoretically enforced energetic ground state
where all those values are uniquely determined, that would uniquely determine
the low energy parameter values as well. According to the present understand-
ing, however, there seem to exist huge numbers of theoretically coherent stable
or meta-stable20 ground states in string theory, which could all be reached in
19 The latter fact is due to the theory's universal character which necessarily also covers the
physics that describes the experimental apparatus.
20 If there exist several local minima of the potential at diﬀerent energy levels, it can be
expected that the lower minimum will eventually be reached by quantum tunneling. However,
depending on the size of the potential barrier and the energy diﬀerence between the ground
states, the time until such quantum tunneling can be statistically expected to occur may be
huge, even greater than the present age of the universe. Thus, we might live such a meta-stable
state of the universe.
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the early quantum processes of our universe21. While an as yet unknown vac-
uum selection mechanism that singles out one or a reasonably small number of
speciﬁc energetic minima may emerge trough a better understanding or substan-
tial reshaping of string physics, its existence appears questionable at this point.
The alternative would be a scenario where the selection from a huge number of
physically allowed local ground states would depend on the accidental outcome of
quantum ﬂuctuations at the initial stages of our universe.22 As diﬀerent ground
states correspond to diﬀerent parameter values of the eﬀective theories at low
energies, that scenario could dramatically reduce string theory's predictive power
(see e.g. Douglas 2003 and Susskind 2007).
Though the question of string theory's predictive power thus remains a matter of
speculation, it is important to notice that both ends of the spectrum of possible
answers suggest a fundamentally altered understanding of scientiﬁc underdetermi-
nation. If the predictive power of string physics were indeed dramatically reduced
by the irreducibly statistical nature of quantum physics, this would signiﬁcantly
alter the perspectives for further physical inquiry. Since it would be diﬃcult to
understand how quantitative aspects which are a matter of quantum statistics
in one scheme should be calculable in another, one might suspect a fundamen-
tal block to scientiﬁc progress, which clearly would change the understanding of
theory succession and presumably should have an impact on the related question
of scientiﬁc underdetermination as well. No more speciﬁc analysis of that point
shall be attempted here, however.
If, on the other hand, some as yet unknown vacuum selection mechanism reduces
the number of physically allowed ground states to an extent that makes string
theory highly predictive23, an even more far-reaching argument could be applied.
In short, a highly predictive structurally unique theory changes the basis for as-
sessing the plausibility of scientiﬁcally viable alternatives. Since (i) structurally
unique theories appear to be much more rare than conventional ones and (ii), if
highly predictive, they cover a far smaller part of the parameter space of imag-
inable observable characteristic numbers, the traditional assessments of scientiﬁc
underdetermination do not apply any more. It is quite implausible to expect
that alternative highly predictive structurally unique theories exist which can to
some accuracy reproduce the parameter values of a given theory of that kind. If
a highly predictive structurally unique theory would turn out to be empirically
viable to a certain degree of accuracy (under a certain set of empirical data), one
thus should be led to presume that this theory cannot be replaced by another
theory that fulﬁlls the condition of highly predictive structural uniqueness. A
21 This of course applies to the canonical understanding of quantum physics. Deterministic
hidden parameter theories would have to determine one unique path towards a predetermined
ground state.
22 Conceptions dealing with eternal inﬂation and multiverse models embed the universe we
inhabit in a grander background scheme.
23 Highly predictive here means roughly that the number of physically possible ground
states of the theory is lower than the number of possible values of some observable that can,
within reasonable boundaries, be distinguished by a precision measurement.
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replacement by a new theory that does not meet that condition would be implau-
sible as well, since the highly predictive structural uniqueness of its predecessor
would then appear like a miracle. Together, the two statements suggest that such
a theory would have to be expected to be a ﬁnal theory that will not be replaced
any more by any empirically diﬀerent alternative at all.
Interestingly, similar ﬁnal theory claims occur in the context of string theory
at other levels as well. String theory is the ﬁrst physical theory that seriously
claims to provide a full conceptual uniﬁcation of all known elementary physical
phenomena, which makes it the ﬁrst ﬁnal theory candidate if full conceptual
uniﬁcation is taken to be a scientiﬁc goal. A more powerful ﬁnal theory claim
is related to an interesting implication of string dualities (see e.g. Witten 2001).
T-duality, which has been brieﬂy described in Section 2, implies an absolute
minimum length in the sense that all empirical tests of distance scales smaller
than the critical scale can, based on duality relations, be understood as tests of
distance scales larger than the critical scale. An absolute limit is set on attaining
new physical information below a certain scale and so formally puts an end to the
continuous physical search for new phenomena at ever smaller distance scales.
While none of the presented arguments in itself constitutes a disproof of the
principle of scientiﬁc underdetermination, the remarkable multitude of diﬀerent
arguments which point in the same direction justiﬁes the claim that a substantial
devaluation of the principle of scientiﬁc underdetermination in the context of
string physics seems plausible. Of course, this statement only acquires signiﬁcance
if string physics turns out to be a viable physical conception. If that were the
case, however, there are many reasons to suspect that it will not any more be
superseded by a successor theory. It should be emphasized that this claim does
not come up to an announcement of an imminent end of fundamental physical
research. The history of string theoretical research suggests that a completion of
the theory may be just as elusive a goal as a ﬁnal theory had seemed to be at
earlier stages of the scientiﬁc evolution.
5.4 Theoretical Uniqueness
In the light of the previous subsection, string theory suggests a radically altered
assessment of the old antagonism between underdetermination and theoretical
prediction. The signiﬁcance of this shift may be understood by reconsidering the
impasse between realism and empiricism sketched in Section 2. The uneasiness
of the status quo was due to the signiﬁcant elements of successful prediction in
science which seemed to favor realism while the equally undeniable elements of
underdetermination seemed to support empiricism. The same kind of unsatisfac-
tory balance characterizes all classical philosophical attempts to undermine the
status of underdetermination. A nice example are the discussions around deduc-
tion from the phenomena, which have drawn some attention in recent years.24
Newton claimed that his physical theories were nothing but deductions from the
phenomena. Norton and some others set out a few years ago to justify Newton's
24 See e. g. Norton (1993), Norton (1994) and Worrall (2000).
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claim and went on to stress the seemingly unique way physical theories are often
enforced by experimental data. Norton, for example, re-emphasized how quanti-
zation was forced upon physics by experiment. The argument of deduction from
the phenomena indeed seems to demonstrate that the case for underdetermina-
tion is not as straightforward as some empiricists might want to believe. However,
this judgment does not come up to a full-scale refutation of underdetermination.
As it was emphasized in Worrall (2000), deductions from the phenomena are al-
ways based on a certain conceptual framework that implicitly constitutes part
of the theoretical scheme. The deductive character of a theory's creation thus
cannot prevent this theory from being superseded by a new one once its con-
ceptive foundations have been revised. To give a prominent example, Newton
deduced the laws of gravitation based on the concept of ﬂat space and general
relativity rejected that point of departure. Deduction from the phenomena shows
that there is a considerable element of uniqueness in the evolution of physical
theory building but it cannot refute the pessimistic meta-induction. It therefore
merely sharpens the impasse between the realist and the empiricist side.
In the case of string theory, the situation is very diﬀerent. Two levels of discus-
sion can be distinguished, which provide two diﬀerent strategies of dealing with
the problem of the pessimistic meta-induction. First, there is the actual status
quo of string theoretical research. String theory today is highly incomplete and in
some respects looks more like a theoretical guideline towards future developments
than a fully ﬂedged theory. The core claim of the pessimistic meta-induction re-
mains intact since string theoretical scientiﬁc concepts today are surely no less
preliminary than the scientiﬁc concepts in previous periods of science. The posit
of scientiﬁc underdetermination, however, cannot proﬁt from this fact any more.
In the traditional picture, the scientiﬁc evolution was taken to be carried by a
sequence of fully consistent theories. Each of these theories correctly described a
limited data set and some day became or was expected to become obsolete due
to new signiﬁcantly contradictive data.25 The pessimistic meta-induction directly
implied scientiﬁc underdetermination since each new theory had to be at least as
convincingly compatible with the old data as its predecessor. In string theory, the
traditional picture is no more applicable. The theoretical scheme at each stage
of physical progress must be understood to be preliminary because it is theoret-
ically insuﬃcient and incomplete. Progress may be expected to arise based on
a more far-reaching understanding of the theory under investigation rather than
on theory replacement. The theoretical work on a deeper understanding and a
fuller and more coherent formulation of string theory establishes purely theo-
retical progress as an equivalent and independent second path towards physical
knowledge besides experimental progress.26
Far beyond the present state of the art lies the projected ideal of the fully con-
sistent string theory. Some characteristics of this ﬁnal theory like its lack of
free parameters or the fundamental lower limit to physical length scales can be
25Naturally, that was always just an idealization of the actual process, but at least it seemed
fairly close to what was actually happening.
26 As we have seen, it is currently the only path open to the physicist.
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conﬁdently predicted already today. Following the arguments of Subsection 5.3,
this knowledge may be taken to justify the assertion that a fully developed string
theory breaks the pessimistic meta-induction. If a full formulation of a consis-
tent string theory could be found one day, one should expect that this theory
is related to the observable world in one of two ways. Either it turns out to be
a dead end without any relation to the physical world at all, or it constitutes a
ﬁnal theory in the sense that it describes all possible experimental data based on
a set of foundational principles without any adjustable fundamental parameters.
In both cases, the fully consistent string theory can not be considered a viable
but refutable intermediate step in the evolution of science in the sense of the
pessimistic meta-induction.
The emerging scenario overcomes the traditional impasse between underdetermi-
nation and theoretical prediction by denying to underdetermination the status
of an eternal characteristic of all scientiﬁc theories. The underdetermination
of traditional physical theories by experiment appears as an historic feature of a
period of fundamental physics that has not yet reached the level of theoretical
interconnectivity necessary to feel the full force of internal consistency arguments.
Already at these earlier stages of the scientiﬁc process, the predictive power of
scientiﬁc theories provides an indication that scientiﬁc underdetermination is not
entirely limitless. The increasing lopsidedness towards theory and the impressive
range of empirical conﬁrmations associated with high energy physics since the
1970s can be read as suggesting signiﬁcant limitations to scientiﬁc underdeter-
mination with particular force. String theory or what it will have become after
completion, ﬁnally might terminate the rule of scientiﬁc underdetermination.
At this point, a crucial question arises: if scientiﬁc underdetermination looses
its eminent position in the face of string physics, what can be said about the
paradigm that replaces it? Let us once again recall the three messages from
string physics which undermine the old picture of scientiﬁcally underdetermined
theory dynamics.
• Characteristics of theory development and internal coherence bolster the
notion of strict limitations to underdetermination that was already inherited
from standard model physics.
• Arguments at various levels support the suspicion that string theory might
be a ﬁnal theory.
• Unlike all previous physical theories, string theory is structurally unique at
a fundamental level.
The three messages jointly lay the foundation for the introduction of a principle
I want to call
The Principle of Theoretical Uniqueness : at a certain stage of scientiﬁc inquiry,
a general set of empirical data together with general preconceptions about the
necessary conditions a theory must fulﬁll for being considered scientiﬁc don't
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leave freedom anymore for choosing theoretical concepts, structural details or
fundamental parameter values. There is exactly one scientiﬁc theory (modulo
empirically equivalent alternative formulations, maybe) that ﬁts the empirical
data. As it seems, the data does not even have to be very speciﬁc but merely has
to establish some elementary qualitative statements about the character of the
physical world.
While the basic principle of theoretical uniqueness ﬁnds considerable support by
our current knowledge about string physics, the principle's strength remains an
open question even under the assumption that string theory is a valid theory
about nature. In order to discuss the range of possibilities, we shall distinguish
three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the term theoretical uniqueness.
The above deﬁnition of theoretical uniqueness does not imply any statement
about the predictive power of the theoretically unique theory. This reﬂects the
fact, discussed in Subsection 5.3, that string theory at the present stage does not
oﬀer a clear picture of its capability of predicting low energy physics parameters.
Depending on its ﬁnal predictive power, string physics may eventually fulﬁll one
of the following two degrees of theoretical uniqueness.
• Weak Theoretical Uniqueness denotes theoretical uniqueness that is not
connected to a unique pattern of low energy parameter values.
• Extended Theoretical Uniqueness denotes the univocal determination of all
quantitative empirical data by the unique theoretical structure.
A theory that fulﬁlls extended structural uniqueness still can not be expected
to determine the local speciﬁcs of the spatio-temporal distribution of physical
objects. The prediction of local matter distribution from ﬁrst principles is tra-
ditionally considered to lie beyond the range of scientiﬁc theories. Transgressing
these limits would lead to a third kind of theoretical uniqueness.
• Strong Theoretical Uniqueness applies if a hypothetical theoretically unique
scientiﬁc theory oﬀers a unique prediction of matter distribution.
While there is nothing in today's understanding of string physics that would sug-
gest strong theoretical uniqueness, the perspective that the latter concept might
some day be applicable to physical theory building is less farfetched than it ap-
pears at ﬁrst sight. First, it must be noted that the diﬀerences between ﬁxing
theoretical low energy parameter values and ﬁxing the distribution of speciﬁc in-
dividual objects get increasingly blurred in the context of string cosmology. The
D-branes whose positions and numbers are presumed to play an important role in
determining the parameter values of the natural laws that guide physics at low en-
ergies are produced by the same quantum oscillations in the early universe which
are also responsible for the universe's matter distribution. A mechanism that
uniquely determines all local aspects of matter distribution thus would not have
to be fundamentally diﬀerent from a mechanism that leaves just one choice for
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low energy parameter values. Extended and strong theoretical uniqueness might
not be too far apart. In addition, it is interesting to remember that one of the
leading interpretations of quantum physics, the Everett interpretation (Everett
1957), is based on the notion that all possible outcomes of a quantum process
are realized and form a complex system of many worlds that constitutes reality.
If one applied this concept to string cosmology, where matter distribution and
low energy parameter values stem from quantum oscillations in the early uni-
verse, this would imply that all possible low energy parameter values as well as
all possible matter distributions are instantiated in one of the many worlds and
thus must be taken to be real. Merging this understanding with the assumption
that string theory is theoretically unique would indeed give the conception of one
unique material realization of reality and therefore establish strong theoretical
uniqueness.27
The demise of scientiﬁc underdetermination and the ascend of theoretical unique-
ness clearly run counter to an antirealist stance. The faltering of the pessimistic
meta-induction removes one of the antirealist's central arguments against real-
ism. Moreover, the general spirit of empiricism seems hardly compatible with
the concept of theoretical uniqueness. Empiricism suggests a highly underdeter-
mined scientiﬁc environment where useful theoretical instruments for describing
the phenomena may be expected to be constructible in fairly arbitrary num-
bers and kinds, in analogy to the freedoms of building technical instruments for
some practical purpose. This understanding, which clearly is constitutive of in-
strumentalism, is shared, by and large, also by constructive empiricism, whose
arguments against realism rely on a general assumption of underdetermination
without addressing the question of the latter's limits.
At this point, string physics thus plainly seems to favor a position of scientiﬁc
realism. The next section will demonstrate, however, that things are a little more
involved than that.
6 Duality versus Ontology
6.1 Ontology and Quantum Physics
For a short moment, it is necessary to return to the opening theme of this ar-
ticle, to quantum mechanics. A venerable tradition among philosophers and
philosophy-minded physicists, ranging from early exponents of the Copenhagen
Interpretation to Bernard d'Espagnat28, asserts the genuinely non-realist qual-
ity of quantum mechanics. One important motive for antirealism with respect
to quantum physics is the understanding that the irreducibly statistical quality
of statements in canonical quantum mechanics and the indeterminist element of
the quantum world contradict our intuitive notion of a well ordered and well de-
ﬁned reality. Many philosophers would agree with the assessment, though, that
27 Note that the Everett interpretation on its own does not imply theoretical uniqueness since
it does not remove the freedom of theory choice.
28 See e. g. d'Espagnat (1989).
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the present status of quantum physics leaves enough room for avoiding antire-
alist conclusions. Non-canonical interpretations of quantum mechanics like the
hidden parameter models of Bohm (Bohm 1952) and Bell (Bell 1987) and the
Everett interpretation oﬀer deterministic and profoundly realist interpretations
of quantum physics. A canonical understanding of the laws of quantum mechan-
ics does not straightforwardly imply non-realism either, but arguably allows for
speciﬁc formulations of scientiﬁc realism.29 In addition, it may well be expected
that basic conceptions of quantum physics will have to be altered to achieve a
full integration of gravitational physics into quantum physics30, which could oﬀer
entirely new perspectives on the question of realism.
Still, there remains an irritating question for the scientiﬁc realist that connects
to the aforementioned general motive for antirealism in quantum physics: if the
intuitive quality of the external ontological object is diminished piece by piece
during the evolutionary progress of physical theory (which must be acknowledged
also in an Everettian or a hidden parameter framework), is there any core of the
notion of an ontological object at all that can be trusted to be immune against
scientiﬁc decomposition and therefore can provide a promising foundation for
realism?
Quantum mechanics cannot answer this question. Contemporary physics is in a
slightly diﬀerent position because the erosion of the ontological object has already
proceeded much further. The dissolution of ontology that starts in quantum
mechanics gains momentum in gauge ﬁeld theory until, in string theory, the
ontological object has simply vanished. The present section will focus on the
(un)happy end of ontology's demise and discuss one speciﬁc feature of string
theory, which constitutes the actual climax of modern physics' anti-ontological
tendencies.
6.2 Ontology and String Dualities
The concept to be considered is string duality, which already played a role in
the previous section. As described in Section 2, T-duality implies that a string
wrapped around a small compact dimension can also be understood as a string
that is not wrapped but moves freely along a large compact dimension. The phe-
nomenon is rooted in the quantum principles but clearly transcends what one is
used to in the quantum world. It is not a mere case of quantum indeterminacy
concerning two states of the system. We rather face two theoretical formulations
which are indistinguishable in principle so that they cannot be interpreted as
referring to two diﬀerent states at all. Nevertheless, the two formulations diﬀer
in characteristics which lie at the core of any meaningful ontology of an exter-
29 For a canonical but still realist interpretation of quantum mechanics see e. g. Redhead
(1987) and Redhead (1995). As an example of the decidedly realist spirit of many standard
textbooks on quantum mechanics, see Messiah (1969), Chapter 4.4.1.
30 Speculations about linking the contraction of the wave function to gravity were for example
formulated by R. Penrose. The question of the genuine non-objectivity of quantum physics will
not be addressed any further in this article. String theory so far has nothing new to say about
the contraction of the wave function.
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nal world. They diﬀer in the shape of space-time and they diﬀer in form and
topological position of the elementary objects.
T-duality is not the only duality relation encountered in string theory. The ex-
istence of dualities turns out to be one of string theory's most characteristic
features. Probably the most important role played by duality relations today is
to connect all diﬀerent superstring theories. Before 1995, physicists knew 5 dif-
ferent types of superstring theory. Then it turned out that these 5 theories and
a 6th by then unknown theory named M-theory are interconnected by duality
relations. Two types of duality are involved. Some theories can be transformed
into each other through the inversion of a compactiﬁcation radius, which is the
phenomenon we know already under the name of T-duality. Others can be trans-
formed into each other by inversion of the string coupling constant. This duality
is called S-duality. Then there is M-theory, where the string coupling constant
is transformed into an additional 11th dimension whose size is proportional to
the coupling strength of the dual theory. The described web of dualities connects
theories whose elementary objects have diﬀerent symmetry structure and diﬀer-
ent dimensionality (as it turns out, each string theory needs a well-deﬁned set
of higher dimensional D-branes to be consistent). M-theory even has a diﬀerent
number of spatial dimensions than its co-theories. Duality nevertheless implies
that M-theory and the 5 possible superstring theories only represent diﬀerent
formulations of one single actual theory. This statement constitutes the basis for
string theory's uniqueness claims and shows the pivotal role played by the dual-
ity principle. In recent years, string-theoretical analysis has discovered even more
surprising duality relations. For example, there exists a duality relation between
certain theories that include gravitation and certain pure gauge theories without
gravitation in a space reduced by one spatial dimension. More discoveries in this
context might well follow in the future.
The fact that diﬀerent string theories with diﬀerent elementary ontologies are
empirically equivalent constitutes an example of the Quinean kind of underde-
termination referred to in Subsection 5.2. In Quine (1970), Quine asserts that
one can always construct scientiﬁc theories which are empirically equivalent but
logically incompatible. In order to delimit this claim from the trivial statement
that there are always diﬀerent ways to tell the same story, Quine distinguishes
simple reconstruals of predicates from ontologically diﬀerent scientiﬁc concepts
(Quine 1975). Reiﬁed objects are taken to be the essential elements of the the-
ory, whose existence claims and observable properties cannot be changed without
creating a new theory. The simple renaming of these objects that does not alter
their properties (e.g. calling the electron proton and vice versa) or the redeﬁ-
nition of parts of the theory that are not reiﬁed (e.g. the change of coordinate
systems) do not generate a new theory. Quine's logically incompatible theories
thus actually represent ontologically incompatible theories. The corresponding
kind of underdetermination thus shall be called ontological underdetermination
from now on.
Ontological underdetermination, like scientiﬁc underdetermination, constitutes a
threat to scientiﬁc realism. If the totality of all possible empirical data uniquely
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determines one ontology of microphysics, a scientiﬁc realist interpretation of the
corresponding theory would seem natural at least in principle.31 If several or
many possible ontological interpretations existed, however, the scientiﬁc real-
ist, who wants to establish her realist interpretation of microphysics based on
abductive inference, would have to ﬁnd good arguments why she rejects one on-
tological interpretation and endorses another. Ontological underdetermination
cannot strictly refute realism, to be sure. The metaphysical realist may insist
that, even if the selection of one set of ontological objects cannot be decided
upon on empirical or rational grounds, there is a true choice after all.32 It will
turn out, however, that ontological underdetermination creates serious problems
for the metaphysical antirealist stance to remain coherent with basic conceptions
of philosophy of science.
Theories related to each other by string dualities are by no means the ﬁrst exam-
ples of empirically equivalent ontologies in science. Two general types of examples
may be distinguished. First, one theoretical scheme can allow various ontological
interpretations. The phenomenon in this case is created at a philosophical level
by imputing an ontology to a physical theory whose structure neither depends
on nor predetermines uniquely that imputation. The physicist puts one com-
pact theoretical structure33 into space-time and the philosopher struggles with
the question at which level ontological claims should be inserted. A prominent
example of this situation is quantum ﬁeld theory where the status of elementary
objects may be attributed either to particles or to ﬁelds. Some philosophers have
taken underdetermination at this level as an argument against a realist basis for
the imputation of ontologies. It might be suggested, however, that ontological al-
ternatives at diﬀerent levels of the theoretical structure, even if they were equally
viable, would not pose a threat to realism per se but should be interpreted merely
as diﬀerent possible parameterizations of one unique external reality.
Second, and resembling more closely the Quinean conception of ontological
underdetermination, there can exist mathematically diﬀerent scientiﬁc schemes
which are ontologically incompatible but describe the same observational world.
Examples are the various empirically equivalent ways to formulate a theory of
gravitation (see e.g. Lyre/Eynck 2003).
String duality posits diﬀerent parallel empirically indistinguishable versions of
structure in space-time which are based on diﬀerent sets of elementary objects.
These posits are placed at the physical level independently of any philosophical
interpretation and therefore fall into the second class of ontological underdeter-
mination. String theory diﬀers from other examples of that kind, however, since
31 The question whether the limited scientiﬁc theories available to us can identify this real
ontology still would remain to be answered, of course.
32 Philosophers like Dummett actually deﬁne realism as a position that allows this kind of
statement (Dummett 1991).
33 To be sure, sometimes there do exist alternative ways to express a physical theory. Quan-
tum mechanics can be formulated in the Heisenberg- or the Schrödinger-picture and quantum
ﬁeld theory in the ﬁeld formalism or the path integral formalism. These alternatives how-
ever are generally taken as alternative mathematical formulations without diﬀering ontological
interpretations.
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it interrelates the ontologically incompatible but empirically equivalent physical
descriptions within one overall scientiﬁc theory.
A number of important problems which have marred previous exempliﬁcations of
ontological underdetermination are softened in the context of dual string theories.
First, there is the question how to distinguish reconstructions of predicates from
other empirically equivalent theories. Unfortunately, it is not always clear which
parts of a theory precisely should be reiﬁed. To give one example, Poincaré's
reformulation of classical mechanics in inﬁnite ﬂat space as a theory with altered
physical laws in a ﬁnite space (Poincaré 1902) may look like a genuinely new
theory if one reiﬁes inﬁnite ﬂat space. Still, the conception is often understood
as a mere reparameterization of classical mechanics and therefore as an example
of a reconstruction of predicates.
Of course, the fundamental question whether it makes sense at all to distinguish
between reconstructions of predicates and empirically equivalent but ontologi-
cally incompatible theories remains unchanged in the context of string dualities.
However, if one decides to introduce such a distinction at all, dual string theories
can be viewed as particularly clear examples of incompatible ontologies. The di-
mensionality and the topological shape of elementary objects seem to be essential
characteristics of any meaningful external ontology. To deny ontological quality
to these characteristics would mean withdrawing into an entirely abstract regime
where an ontology cannot any more be understood in terms of a characterization
of the external world. The existence of dual theories thus proves particularly
problematic for an ontologically realist interpretation of scientiﬁc theories.
The case of string dualities is also better suited than other examples of ontological
underdetermination to deal with the problem of the preliminary status of scien-
tiﬁc theories. Quine asserts that the totality of all possible empirical evidence
underdetermines the choice of a scientiﬁc scheme. Attempts to ﬁnd scientiﬁc
theories which can serve as examples of underdetermination usually fall short of
exemplifying Quine's assertion for a simple reason: scientiﬁc theories in general
cannot be expected to ﬁt all possible empirical evidence. The speciﬁc status of
string theory changes this situation in two respects. First, as has been discussed
already in Section 5, string theory oﬀers a number of reasons for being called a
ﬁnal theory. Therefore, the assertion that string theory, if fully understood, could
ﬁt all possible empirical evidence, has a certain degree of plausibility. Second, in
the context of string theory the claim of ontological underdetermination is not
based on the accidental occurrence of several empirically equivalent theoretical
schemes but on a physical principle, the principle of duality, which represents a
deep characteristic of the involved theories and may be expected to be a stable
feature of future fundamental physics. It seems plausible to assume that the dual-
ity principle will continue to play an important role even if string theory changed
substantially in the course of future research.
The occurrence of ontological underdetermination thus does not any more look
accidental but is made a core physical statement. This can be understood as a
genuinely physical argument against the assumption of one real scientiﬁc ontol-
ogy. The method of abductive reasoning, to which the scientiﬁc realist wishes to
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resort, in this case suggests the abandonment of ontological realism. The posit
of one real ontology just does not seem to be the best explanation of the obser-
vation that nature is characterized by the existence of empirical equivalent but
ontologically incompatible theoretical descriptions. The die-hard metaphysical
realist can resist this argument but, by doing so, puts herself at variance with a
core principle of scientiﬁc realism, the principle of abduction.
There exists an additional aspect of string duality that strengthens the anti-
ontological message of string duality compared to other exempliﬁcations of onto-
logical underdetermination. Duality does not just spell destruction for the notion
of the ontological scientiﬁc object but in a sense oﬀers a replacement as well. By
identifying theories with diﬀerent sets of elementary objects, it reduces the num-
ber of independent possible theories eventually down to one. While the unique-
ness of the elementary objects is lost, duality thus provides a diﬀerent quality of
uniqueness, the theoretical uniqueness that played the main role in the previous
section. The signiﬁcance of this remarkable process will become transparent later
on.
6.3 The Demise of Ontology
Do there remain any loop-holes in duality's antirealist implications? A natural
objection to the asserted crucial philosophical importance of duality can be based
on the fact that duality was not invented in the context of string theory. It
is known since the times of P. M. Dirac that quantum electrodynamics with
magnetic monopoles would be dual to a theory with inverted coupling constant
and exchanged electric and magnetic charges. The question arises, if duality is
poison to ontological realism, why didn't it have its eﬀect already at the level of
quantum electrodynamics. The answer gives a nice survey of possible measures
to save ontological realism. As it will turn out, they all fail in string theory.
In the case of quantum-electrodynamics, the realist has several arguments to
counter the duality threat. First, duality looks more like an accidental oddity that
appears in an unrealistic theoretical scenario than like a characteristic feature of
the world. No one has observed magnetic monopoles, which renders the problem
hypothetical. And even if there were magnetic monopoles, an embedding of
electromagnetism into a fuller description of the natural forces would destroy the
dual structure anyway.
As discussed already, the situation is very diﬀerent in string theory. Duality is no
lucky strike any more, which just by chance arises in one speciﬁc scenario. It
rather represents a core feature of the emerging theoretical structure and cannot
be ignored. Due to the described termination of new phenomena below the string
scale it cannot be expected either that new phenomena will arise which could
destroy the duality relations.
A second option open to the realist at the level of quantum electrodynamics is
to shift the ontological posit. As it was alluded to above, some philosophers
of quantum physics argue that the natural elementary object of quantum ﬁeld
theory is the quantum ﬁeld, which represents something like the potentiality to
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produce elementary particles. One quantum ﬁeld covers the full sum over all
variations of particle exchange which have to be accounted for in a quantum
process. The philosopher who posits the quantum ﬁeld to be the fundamental
real object discovered by quantum ﬁeld theory understands the single elementary
particles as mere mathematical entities introduced to calculate the behavior of
the quantum ﬁeld. Dual theories from this perspective can be taken as diﬀerent
technical procedures to calculate the behavior of the univocal ontological object,
the electromagnetic quantum ﬁeld. The phenomenon of duality then does not
appear as a threat to the ontological concept per se but merely as an indication
in favor of an ontologization of the ﬁeld instead of the particle.
The ﬁeld theoretical approach to interpret the quantum ﬁeld as the ontological
object does not have any pendent in string theory. String theory only exists as
a perturbative theory. There seems to be no way of introducing anything like a
quantum ﬁeld that would cover the full expansion of string exchanges. In the light
of duality, this lack of a unique ontological object arguably looks rather natural.
The reason for that is related to another point that makes string dualities more
dramatic than its ﬁeld theoretical predecessor. String theory includes gravitation.
Therefore, object (the 1+1-dimensional string world-sheet) and space-time are
not independent. Actually, it turns out that the string world-sheet geometry
in a way carries all information about space-time as well. This dependence of
space-time on string-geometry makes it diﬃcult already to imagine how it should
be possible to put into this very space-time some kind of overall ﬁeld whose
coverage of all string realizations actually implies coverage of variations of space-
time itself. The duality context makes the paradoxical quality of such an attempt
more transparent. If two dual theories with diﬀerent radii of a compactiﬁed
dimension are to be covered by the same ontological object in analogy to the
quantum ﬁeld in ﬁeld theory, this object obviously cannot live in space and time.
If it would, it had to choose one of the two space-time versions endorsed by the
dual theories, thereby discriminating the other one. It might well happen that
at some time string theorists will ﬁnd a more fundamental theoretical basis for
string theory that is unique and non-perturbative and from which all 6 theories
known today can be derived. This theory, however, should not be expected to
be a theory of objects in space-time and therefore does not raise any hopes of
redeeming the external ontological perspective.
A third strategy to save ontological realism is based on the following argument:
In quantum electrodynamics the diﬀerence between the dual theories boils down
to a mere replacement of a weak coupling constant which allows perturbative
calculation by a strong one which does not. Therefore, the physicist faces the
choice between a natural formulation and a clumsy untreatable one which maybe
should just be discarded as an artiﬁcial construction.
Today, string theory cannot tell whether its ﬁnal solutions  given they ex-
ist - put its parameters comfortably into the low-coupling-constant-and-large-
compact-dimension-regime of one of the 5 superstring theories or M-theory. This
might be the case but it might as well happen that solutions lie in a region of
parameter space where no theory clearly stands out in this sense. However, even
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if there were one preferred theory, the simple discarding of the others could not
save realism as in the case of ﬁeld theory. First, the argument of natural choice
is not really applicable to T-duality. A small compactiﬁcation radius does not
render a theory intractable like a large coupling constant. The choice of the dual
version with a large radius thus rather looks like an arbitrary convention. Second,
the choice of both compactiﬁcation radii and string coupling constants in string
theory is the consequence of a dynamical process that has to be calculated itself.
Calculation thus stands before the selection of a certain point in parameter space
and consequently also before a possible selection of the ontological objects. The
ontological objects therefore, even if one wanted to hang on to their meaningful-
ness in the ﬁnal scenario, would appear as a mere product of prior dynamics and
not as a priori actors in the game.
Summing up, the phenomenon of duality is admittedly a bit irritating for the
ontological realist in ﬁeld theory but she can live with it.34 In string theory
however, the ﬁeld theoretical strategies to save realism all fail. The position
assumed by the duality principle in string theory clearly renders obsolete the
traditional realist understanding of scientiﬁc objects as smaller cousins of visible
ones. The theoretical posits of string theory get their meaning only relative to
their theoretical framework and must be understood as mathematical concepts
without any claim to corporal existence in an external world. The world of
string theory has cut all ties with classical theories about physical bodies. To
stick to ontological realism in this altered context, would be inadequate to the
elementary changes which characterize the new situation. String theory simply
is no theory about invisible external objects.
7 Consistent Structure Realism
Three distinct statements about string theory's impact on the scientiﬁc realism
debate have evolved in the previous sections and now await to be put into con-
text. First, the increasing disproportion between the richness of the theoretical
structure in modern physical theories and the minimalism of their directly visible
eﬀects renders an empiricist stance highly implausible. Second and fully in line
with the realist tendency of the ﬁrst point, string theory gives rise to a principle
of theoretical uniqueness that is at variance with the conceptual basis of empiri-
cism. Third, however, the philosophical doubts of scientiﬁc non-realists about
the stability of the ontological basis of scientiﬁc realism are maximally conﬁrmed
by string theory. The notion of the external ontological object evaporates in the
presence of strings. A joint resume of all three statements conveys a clear mes-
sage: neither the established brands of scientiﬁc antirealism nor the conventional
ontological formulation of scientiﬁc realism are compatible with spirit and content
of string physics.
34 From a string theoretical perspective, Dirac's electromagnetic duality of course foreshadows
the upcoming situation and represents a good example how what fully emerges in string theory
has its roots in prior physical concepts.
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String theory thus suggests a middle position in the realism debate, which estab-
lishes the objective status of a ﬁnal scientiﬁc theory without ontological connota-
tions. The cogency of this suggestion is enhanced by the fact that the realist and
antirealist tendencies of string physics ﬁnd their sharpest expression based on the
same physical concept: the concept of string duality. By reducing the ﬁve seem-
ingly independent models of superstrings to diﬀerent formulations of the same
theoretical scheme, string dualities lay the ground for theoretical uniqueness but
concurrently deliver the lethal blow to ontological realism. An intermediate po-
sition between ontological realism and empiricism thus appears as an immediate
consequence of the theoretical structure of string physics.
Moreover, the string-induced arguments pro and contra realism are related to the
markedly diﬀerent fates of two distinct versions of one basic philosophical princi-
ple: the principle of underdetermination. While ontological underdetermination
assumes a central position in string physics, scientiﬁc underdetermination loses
its former position. Couched in terms of the concept of uniqueness, the statement
may be made more precise: ontological uniqueness, the notion that the theoretical
scheme comprises one uniquely identiﬁable set of elementary ontological objects
in space and time, must be abandoned, but uniqueness reappears in the new
form of theoretical uniqueness, the notion that the basic layout of our observa-
tional world allows only one universal scientiﬁc theory (modulo what Quine calls
reconstrucals of predicates35 at a fundamental level.
Given that the uniqueness of the real constitutes a core element of any realist
conception, it is plausible to interpret the transfer of uniqueness as an indication
of a transformation from an ontological towards a structural form of realism. It
is instructive to make one step backwards and distinguish two steps of a trans-
fer of the quality of uniqueness which both can contribute to a structural realist
understanding. First, the realist posit simply must recede from an ontological to
a structural level because the uniqueness claims recede the same way. While no
unique ontology of objects in space and time can be imputed any more, there still
remains the fact that the various empirically equivalent ontological sets are all
covered by one overall theoretical scheme. Thus, at a higher level of abstraction
at which a scientiﬁc theory cannot anymore be conceived of in terms of putting a
speciﬁc structure into spacetime, a unique structure can be identiﬁed and under-
stood in realist terms. This may be taken to be suﬃcient for positing some kind of
structural realism. The highly abstract level at which structural reality is placed
may be considered to be a problematic foundation for an intuitively satisfactory
form of realism, however, if no other arguments support a realist conception.
Theoretical uniqueness obviously goes far beyond the uniqueness argument de-
ployed in the last paragraph and thereby adds an important new element to a
structural understanding of realism. In a conventional scientiﬁc setting that does
not imply theoretical uniqueness, one must at each stage of the scientiﬁc process
expect the possibility of theories which are compatible with the available em-
pirical data but diﬀer from the one speciﬁc theory that is realized in the actual
world. Two problems therefore arise. On the one hand, it remains unclear how
35See Subsection 6.2.
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the currently chosen scientiﬁc structures can be related to the real structure in a
way that goes beyond the strictly empiricist point that the two are observation-
ally indistinguishable up to a certain level of experimental precision.36 On the
other hand, it seems diﬃcult to pinpoint in what sense the empirically adequate
structure acquires reality. The latter problem becomes more troublesome in a
scenario where, as discussed above, the real structure cannot be put into space
and time.
If the physical description is theoretically unique, however, consistency in connec-
tion with the correctness of the deployed basic preconceptions about the charac-
teristics of a scientiﬁc theory turns into a suﬃcient condition for the real existence
of fundamental structure. Once there remains only one universal consistent sci-
entiﬁc scheme, from that point onwards exhaustive knowledge about the real
theoretical structure can not only be acquired by empirical testing but also by
pure theorizing. Thus, both questions posed above can ﬁnd a more satisfactory
answer. First, there is a clear way in which the present scientiﬁc theories are
related to real structure. The real structure is the only possible universal and
fully consistent improvement of the limited or not fully developed theoretical
structures available today. Current scientiﬁc theories thus approach structural
reality by extending their own consistent regime. Second, by acquiring a signiﬁ-
cant degree of epistemic independence from phenomenology, structure assumes a
role that goes far beyond what would be acceptable from an empiricist point of
view, which justiﬁes a realist interpretation.
In order to use the concept of theoretical uniqueness as a foundational element
of a structural kind of realism, the notion that string physics suggests theoretical
uniqueness must be turned into the philosophical posit that theoretical unique-
ness constitutes an essential quality of our world. Real structure then can be
taken to be deﬁned by the fact that it constitutes the unique consistent univer-
sal scientiﬁc structure. A position along these lines shall be called consistent
structure realism.
Consistent structure realism clearly is related to the kinds of structural realism
proposed by Worrall (1989) and Ladyman (1998) based on quite diﬀerent lines of
argument. Worrall argues for structural realism by reassessing the validity of the
pessimistic meta-induction. The latter, he claims, successfully undermines the
long-term stability of ontological objects but does not oﬀer reasons for doubting
the stability of the fundamental structural characteristics of scientiﬁc theories
(which, according to Worrall, mostly survive theory change). Worrall therefore
suggests that structural reality is all that can be grasped by scientiﬁc inquiry -
though not necessarily all there is. Ladyman questioned the coherence of Worrall's
epistemological form of structural realism and suggested an ontic version instead
36 This problem was discussed e.g. in Psillos (1999) in the context of structural realism.
Since not all aspects of structure are fully transferred from one scientiﬁc theory to its successor
theory (if so, that would imply the empirical equivalence of the two theories), structural realism
must be based on the qualiﬁed claim that the structures of present scientiﬁc theories can be
expected to be similar to the real structure. Based on this similarity claim, the present theories'
structural statements may be expected to be approximately true. It is diﬃcult, however, to pin
down in which way the similarity between structures can be deﬁned.
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that denies reality beyond structure. The string-theory-based arguments which
suggest consistent structure realism obviously do not rely on the pessimistic meta-
induction, which, according to Section 5, loses most of its signiﬁcance. Instead,
they crucially rely on the demise of ontological uniqueness. While a lack of
ontological uniqueness at face value is compatible with the metaphysical posit
of ontological reality, it has been argued in Section 6 that core elements of the
conception of scientiﬁc realism would be at variance with such a posit. In the
context of the scientiﬁc realism debate, structural implications of string physics
thus should work at an ontological rather than at an epistemological level and
suggest an ontic form of structural realism. Still, consistent structure realism
diﬀers from Ladyman's ontic structural realism in its reliance on purely theoretical
epistemic access to structural reality.
Because of the latter, consistent structure realism can be more timid than struc-
tural realism with respect to the question of the approximate truth of current
scientiﬁc statements. Since a theory's closeness to true structure can be gauged
by its closeness to the fully universal and consistent theoretical scheme, consis-
tent structure realism can provide a meaningful notion of realism without relying
on claims about the truth or approximate truth of current scientiﬁc theories.
For the consistent structure realist, the unique consistent structure constitutes a
crucial but somewhat remote aspect of reality. Any discovery of new theoretical
interconnections necessitated by consistency arguments produces new logically
true statements, thereby contributes to a better understanding of the character
of the true structure and thus reveals something about reality. In case of a fully
universal theory like string theory, the true theory is approached by acquiring
a better and more complete understanding of the theory in question. At earlier
stages of theory development, where fundamental theories have a limited scope,
truth is approached by extending the theories' scope. Of course, modern theories
in fundamental physics can get and must be hoped to get important input from
phenomenology in the form of experimental checks of the scientiﬁc statements
based on consistency arguments. But phenomenology is not what modern funda-
mental physical theories are about. It is a long way from the lines on a picture
in a particle scattering experiment to the structures of the Standard Model and
a longer way still from the falling apple to superstrings. The consistency argu-
ments which lead this way univocally are the true discoveries of modern physics
and they represent the microphysical reality that is being described.
Up to this point, consistent structure realism has been developed based on the
weak form of theoretical uniqueness. The uniqueness of structure has been ex-
ploited without any reference to empirical prediction. The conceptual power of
consistent structure realism might be signiﬁcantly enhanced, though, if it were
based on extended or strong theoretical uniqueness. It may be of interest to
spend a few thoughts on these scenarios in order to assess the more far-reaching
perspectives opened up by the presented kind of analysis.
Extended theoretical uniqueness provides scientiﬁc theoretical analysis with the
capacity to determine and predict phenomenological regularities uniquely from
a certain stage onwards. While weak theoretical uniqueness implied epistemic
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independence of real structure from phenomenology, its extension thus attributes
to real structure the unique observable realization of phenomenological laws. It
is not quite clear whether this step can be taken to add substantial strength to
the concept of consistent structure realism. On the one hand, it might seem
that realism based on unique consistent structure gains plausibility if uniqueness
extends to the regime of observable physical objects at some level, since only that
step can provide an understanding how consistent structure realism connects to
intuitive notions of realism. On the other hand, one might argue that not much is
won besides deceptive intuitiveness, since the diﬀerence between local and global
characteristics of the world loses its fundamental character in string theory and
modern cosmology (see Section 5). At a fundamental level, the step towards
extended uniqueness thus does not seem to change the character of consistent
structure realism.
Strong theoretical uniqueness would constitute a far more fundamental change.
It would imply the unique determination of the global and local realization of
the world based on theoretical arguments. No room would be left for potentiality
once the basic preconceptions about scientiﬁc theory building and some qualita-
tive phenomenological information about our world were taken for granted. On
that basis, then, reality could be identiﬁed with internal consistency, which would
oﬀer an interesting new foundation for the concept of realism. If modality were
fully dissolved, the question of pinpointing reality would become a mere question
of consistency. In the analyzed case, modality is not dissolved entirely but has
receded dramatically to the acceptance of basic preconceptions and observations.
Reality then becomes a question of consistency on the basis of a core of observa-
tional data and the validity of the basic preconceptions. The grasp of the notion
of structural reality can be improved by analyzing and specifying the amount of
empirical data and the character of basic preconceptions necessary for reaching
the regime of theoretical uniqueness. The farther both of these can be rolled
back, the stronger a realist position can become.
It is clear that even under the condition of strong theoretical uniqueness theoret-
ical structure remains dependent on phenomenology. As mentioned above, the
physical principles which lay the foundations for the evolution of theory build-
ing are still rooted in observation. Without a certain amount of observational
data about the world none of the physical consistency arguments could get oﬀ
the ground. In addition, scientiﬁc theories still are theories about observables.
They predict observable properties and their uniqueness must be understood
with respect to their observational predictions. On the other hand, the speciﬁc
realization of the observational world in a strongly theoretically unique scenario
appears like a secondary aspect of consistency arguments. Thus emerges an in-
tricate compound of mutual dependence between observational and structural
aspects of reality whose full disentangling lies beyond the scope of the present
article.
In conclusion, string physics seems to suggest a position in the scientiﬁc realism
debate that may be called realist for a number of reasons but diﬀers from classical
realist positions in several respects. In the light of what has been said in Section 3,
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this assessment can be set against the background of genuinely philosophical
reasoning that indicates the importance of the search for intermediate positions
between classical realism and empiricism. The messages from string physics thus
coincide remarkably well with internal needs of the scientiﬁc realism debate and
could show crucial aspects of that debate in a new light. Physical arguments
therefore might turn out to be truly helpful in providing new answers to old
philosophical problems. On the other hand, philosophy gains new importance
for fundamental physics as well. Subsection 5.4 has alluded to the point that a
new philosophical perspective may become necessary to acquire an appropriate
understanding of the relevance and status of string theory as a physical theory.
We witness strong signs for a novel fertile interdependence between contemporary
fundamental physics and philosophy of science. At a time when both ﬁelds feel
the need to transcend the traditional frameworks their rapprochement comes at
hands.
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